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Homelessness and the Affordable Housing
Shortage: What Is to Be Done?
Eila Savela*
The issue of proper care for the homeless matters so much. It
is, without being dramatic about it, a matter of life and death.
Unfed, the homeless starve. Unsheltered, they die of the cold.
Funneled into shelters and hotels which are overcrowded and
undersupervised, they get robbed, they get raped, they die in
accidents. They get beaten to death.1
Introduction
Homelessness, 2 contrary to popular belief, is not a modern
phenomenon.3 Within the past decade, however, homelessness
metamorphosed from the cyclical displacement of laborers to the
promiscuous displacement of persons whose only common denomi-
nator is the lack of shelter. The polarization of our economy
through deindustrialization and fundamental changes in the build-
ing industry contributed directly to the depletion of low-income
housing stock.4 The federal government's failure to recognize and
* A.B., Harvard & Radcliffe Colleges (1986); J.D., University of Minnesota
(1991). The author would like to thank Jack Perry, Samuel Goodrich, Jen Wolter,
and Scott Johnson for their advice and support on this article.
1. National Mental Health Association & Families for the Homeless, Homeless
in America 12 (Michael Evans ed. 1988).
2. This article defines the homeless as those who lack a residence. The Home-
less Assistance Act defines a homeless individual or homeless person as:
(1) an individual who lacks a fixed, regular, and adequate nighttime
residence; and
(2) an individual who has a primary nighttime residence that is
(A) a supervised publicly or privately operated shelter designed to
provide temporary living accommodations (including welfare hotels,
congregate shelters, and transitional housing for the mentally ill);
(B) an institution that provides a temporary residence for individu-
als intended to be institutionalized; or
(C) a public or private place not designed for, or ordinarily used as,
a regular sleeping accommodation for human beings.
Homeless Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11302(a) (1990).
3. Poverty and homelessness seem to be part of the human condition. For a
succinct synopsis of the history of homelessness, see Kim Hopper, The Ordeal of
Shelter: Continuities and Discontinuities in the Public Response to Homelessness, 4
Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 301, 301-14 (1989) (tracing responses to home-
lessness from the Classical period).
4. United States' industries, especially transnational corporations, are becom-
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remedy the affordable housing shortage, in turn, led to a homeless-
ness crisis evocative of the Great Depression.5 Other factors insti-
gating homelessness-unemployment, decreasing federal
assistance, discrimination, and deinstitutionalization of mentally ill
patients6--exacerbate the housing crisis and follow from changes
in our national economy and the federal government's laissez faire
policies. 7
The tension between the private housing industry's interests
and the needs of low-income consumers undermines the efficacy of
federal housing programs. The private housing industry generally
determines the supply, availability, cost, and location of housing.8
Federal intervention in the housing industry accommodates the
economic interests of private industry, rather than the needs of
consumers, due to its faith in the free market system.9
Private industry creates low-income housing indirectly, ac-
cording to supply-side economics' "trickle-down" theory, which is
used to justify reliance upon the free market. According to this
theory, the creation of new housing always benefits the poor.
High-income consumers buy new homes, causing a chain reaction
of housing transactions. As consumers sell older, less expensive
homes, the stock of low-income housing progressively increases.
As long as the market acts according to theory, adequate housing
ing internationalized, that is, are adapting to an international economy. Conse-
quently, industries are simultaneously collapsing and emerging (deindustrialization
and reindustrialization). The manufacturing industries of the United States, nota-
bly the steel and rubber industries, are disappearing, while technical and garment
industries are flourishing. Joe Feagin & Michael Smith, Cities and the New Inter-
national Division of Labor: An Overview, in The Capitalist City 3-17 (1987); David
C. Perry, The Politics of Dependency in Deindustrializing America: The Case of
Buffalo, New York, in The Capitalist City, supra, at 120-24 (see Table 5.1 and Table
5.2); Edward Soja, Economic Restructuring and Internationalization of the Los An-
geles Region, in The Capitalist City, supra, at 181-85. The emerging industries cre-
ate an economically polarized work force, with the blue collar middle class rapidly
diminishing in size. Soja, supra, at 185. See also Kim Hopper, Ezra Susser & Sarah
Conover, Economies of Makeshift Deindustrialization and Homelessness in New
York City, in The Rights of the Homeless: 1988, at 25-26 (1988). This study ana-
lyzed the work force in New York City during the past decade and concluded that a
two tier work hierarchy has evolved, due to the loss of manufacturing and public
sector jobs and the proliferation of low-wage service jobs. Id.
5. Kim Hopper & Jill Hamberg, The Making of America's Homeless;" From
Skid Row to New Poor, 1945-1984, in Critical Perspectives on Housing 12 (1986).
6. See imra notes 37-60.
7. Chester Hartman, Housing Policies Under the Reagan Administration, in
Critical Perspectives on Housing, supra note 5, at 363.
8. Emily Paradise Achtenberg & Peter Marcuse, The Causes of the Housing
Problem, in Critical Perspectives on Housing, supra note 5, at 5.
9. Id. at 7-8 (government enhances opportunities for private profit and pla-
cates dissatisfied social groups).
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is provided for everyone.10
As a rule, the federal government's regulation of housing is
viewed as "unneeded and counterproductive," and "[c]onstruction
subsidy programs are inefficient because they substitute govern-
mental regulation for market discipline.""
Previously, federal programs addressed supply-side deficien-
cies, and programs provided funding for low-interest mortgages
and public housing. Fundamental shifts in federal housing policy
during the 1970s and 1980s towards demand-side deficiencies re-
versed long-term trends toward providing low-income housing.' 2
Basic shelter, much less home ownership, is currently beyond the
means of hundreds of thousands of Americans.' 3
A revised federal housing program could successfully amelio-
rate homelessness.14 Part I of this paper describes the extent,
characteristics, and underlying causes of homelessness in the
United States. Part II analyzes the inadequacy of judicial activism,
state responses, and current federal policies toward the homeless.
Part III discusses solutions and concludes that none of these pro-
grams can stand alone. Alternatively, this article suggests that the
federal government should revise subsidized public housing pro-
grams, thereby conserving existing housing stock and creating des-
perately needed new housing.
I. The State of Homelessness
A Demographics
Homelessness is ubiquitous; it is found in rural as well as
metropolitan areas,' 5 and afflicts all low-income groups indiscrimi-
10. Todd Swanstrom, No Room at the Inn: Housing Policy and the Homeless, 35
J. Urb. & Contemp. L. 81, 88-91 (1989).
11. Peter Marcuse, Housing Policy and the Myth of the Benevolent State, in
Critical Perspectives on Housing, supra note 5, at 258-59.
12. Swanstrom, supra note 10, at 89-98; see also Joint Center for Housing Stud-
ies of Harvard University, The State of the Nation's Housing: 1988, Exhibit 21 and
accompanying text (1988) (housing assistance resources have failed to keep pace
with growth of low-income renter households); id at Exhibit 16 (home ownership
declined from 65.6% in 1980 to 64.0% in 1987).
13. See Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University, supra note 12,
at apps. 9, 10, 12.
14. This article does not discuss the special needs of single parent families or
the mentally disabled. See Patrick Carty, Preventing Homelessness: Rent Control
or Rent Assistance, 4 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 365 (1989) (addresses
preventing homelessness for single parent, female-headed households). Rather, the
creation of low-income housing is generally addressed.
15. See L.A. Times, Jan. 1, 1989, § 1, at 24, col. 1.
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nately. At least 90,000 people sleep without shelter each night,' 6
and perhaps as many as three million Americans are homeless.17
Studies indicate that homelessness is steadily increasing's and that
episodic homelessness is an "urban survival strategy."19 These sta-
tistics demonstrate the magnitude and urgency of the housing cri-
sis. The housing crisis is not a temporary aberration: it threatens
an increasing number of low-income Americans.
In the 1980s, the demographics of homelessness changed dra-
matically.20 The modern homeless person, unlike the stereotypical
skid row misanthrope, does not choose to live in the street.2 ' A
disproportionate number of women, minorities, unskilled workers,
veterans, and the mentally disabled are homeless. 22 Families with
16. Office of Policy Dev. and Research, Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., A Re-
port to the Secretary on the Homeless and Emergency Shelters (Apr. 23, 1984).
17. House Comm. on Banking, Finance & Urban Affairs, H.R. Rep. No. 100-
10(I), 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 17-18, reprinted in 1987 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News 362, 362-63 (explicitly rejected lower HUD Report estimates of 250,000 to
300,000 American homeless); Mary Hombs & Mitch Snyder, Homelessness in
America: A Forced March to Nowhere, xvi (1982); Pamela Siebert, Homeless Peo-
ple: Establishing Rights to Shelter, 4 Law & Inequality 393, 394 (1986) (citing esti-
mate of Community for Creative Non-Violence and the National Coalition for the
Homeless). Other studies suggest that the number of homeless hovers at approxi-
mately three million. National Coalition for the Homeless, Homelessness in the
United States: Background and Federal Response-A BriefKng Paper for Congres-
sional Candidates, in The Rights of the Homeless: 1988, supra note 4, at 70 n.1.
18. National Coalition for the Homeless, Homelessness in the United States.
Background and Federal Response-A Briefing Paper for Congressional Candi-
dates, in The Rights of the Homeless: 1988, supra note 4, at 70 n.2 (citing Confer-
ence of Mayors, The Continuing Growth of Hunger, Homeless and Poverty in
America's Cities: 1987, at 15 (1987); National Coalition for the Homeless, Pushed
Out America's Homeless, Thanksgiving, 1988, at 1 (1987)); see also Amherst H. Wil-
der Foundation, Results of the Twin City Survey of Emergency Shelter Residents
24 (1989).
19. Hopper, Susser & Conover, supra note 4, at 193. The demand for emer-
gency shelters increased twenty-one percent on average in 1986 among UNCF
member cities. United States Conference of Mayors, The Continuing Growth of
Hunger, Homelessness and Poverty in America's Cities: 1987, at 21, 41 (1987).
20. Hopper & Hamberg, supra note 5, at 17.
21. Skid rows developed during the Great Depression and almost disappeared
by the late 1960s, before reversals in federal housing policy and the economy cre-
ated a new generation of homeless persons. Skid row occupants generally chose to
live on the streets and its population was:
almost exclusively .. . men, usually older white men, many of whom
had long resided at the margins of polite society and a good proportion
of whom suffered from chronic ailments, especially alcoholism ....
With rare exception . . . the studies of this period found not commu-
nity but exile-a listless, aimless world, void of ambition or bonds,
populated by casualties of poverty, pathology, old age, character defi-
ciencies, or alcohol dependency.
Hopper & Hamberg, supra note 5, at 16-17. See generally Carl Cohen & Jay
Sokolovsky, Old Men of the Bowery: Strategies for Survival Among the Homeless
(1989).
22. National Coalition for the Homeless, supra note 17, at 71-72; Richard Rop-
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children currently compose from thirty-three to forty percent of
those without shelter.23
Despite these disturbing trends, the federal government
steadfastly adheres to the traditional view that "the causes of
homelessness are situated in personal pathologies," 24 such as alco-
holism, drug addiction, and mental disability, although evidence
suggests such a view is inaccurate.2 5 Nevertheless, the conserva-
tive administration evades its responsibility to assist the homeless
by miscasting the homeless as the "undeserving poor."26 In the
United States, the poor are stigmatized and blamed for their pov-
erty.2 7 Blaming the victims obviates the need to take action
against private interests, and ensures the perpetuation of a cheap
labor pool.28 Only during periods of extreme economic distress
and political activism by the disadvantaged does the government
respond to the needs of the poor by recognizing that the poor need
assistance.2 9 The conditions are now ripe for federal recognition of
its obligation to provide for the homeless as victims of a rapidly
changing economy.
B. Are Shelters Enough?
The crisis facing the displaced poor threatens to become a
permanent feature of American society.3 0 Length of residence at
welfare hotels in New York City averages over one year.31 A sig-
nificant proportion (37%) of shelter users have been homeless for
over one year.3 2 The tight housing market has transformed emer-
gency shelters into permanent housing by default. Emergency
shelters are not designed to be homes. Frequently, abandoned
ers, The Invisible Homeless: A New Urban Ecology 109 (1988); Amherst H. Wilder
Foundation, supra note 18, at 8; Metropolitan Council, Homelessness in the Twin
Cities Metropolitan Area 8 (1986).
23. National Coalition for the Homeless, supra note 17, at 71-72.
24. Ropers, supra note 34, at 115.
25. National Coalition for the Homeless, supra note 17, at 71-72.
26. See Ropers, supra note 22, at 115.
27. The perverse practice of stigmatizing the poor for their poverty is particu-
larly virulent in the United States, due to the "American belief in economic indi-
vidualism." Frances Piven & Richard Cloward, Regulating the Poor: The Functions
of Public Welfare 46 (1971). Poverty is viewed as a product of laziness rather than
the consequence of insurmountable obstacles to self-help. Id.
28. Id. at 3, 123-77.
29. I& at 7.
30. See Ropers, supra note 22, at 116.
31. Victor Bach & Rennee Steinhagen, Alternatives to the Welfare Hotel: Using
Emergency Assistance to Provide Decent Transitional Shelter for Homeless Fami-
lies 13 (1987).
32. Amherst H. Wilder Foundation, supra note 18, at 10; Metropolitan Council,
supra note 22, at 9.
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buildings and hotel rooms are converted into "temporary"
shelter.3 3
Shelters provide a makeshift solution at best. The homeless
turn to shelters as a last resort, because they are denigrated and
abused by an impersonal shelter bureaucracy. Typically, a home-
less person risks "brutalization by armed guards, being put back
on the streets at 5:30 A.M. in an unfamiliar area... theft of per-
sonal property; [and] an abundance of lice and bedbugs."3 4 Aliena-
tion and feelings of powerlessness are exacerbated by the
misconceptions about the homeless and callousness of the
"housed":
As we sat on the grate, day after day, thousands of people
walked or drove by. They looked through or beyond us, when
we caught them furtively glancing in our direction. It was a
frightening and amazing experience. What was more incredi-
ble was the discovery of just how quickly one's sense of sub-
stance and self-worth melts away under these conditions.3 5
Living on the streets and in emergency shelters puts the homeless
under constant psychological stress and physical danger.
Assistance programs for the homeless, on local, state, and na-
tional levels, continue to treat the symptoms of homelessness,
rather than its causes. Unless the causes of homelessness are
treated, the temporarily homeless will become a permanent pow-
erless underclass.3 6
C Causes
Four interrelated factors underlie the homelessness crisis:
the mass release of mentally disabled patients from hospitals;
shrinking public assistance programs; unemployment; and the na-
tion's severe shortage of low-cost housing.3 7 A fifth element, dis-
crimination, limits the housing opportunities for minorities and
33. Ellen Baxter & Kim Hopper, Private Lives/Public Spaces: Homeless Adults
on the Streets of New York City 50-54 (1981).
34. Hombs & Snyder, supra note 17, at 57.
35. Id. at 115; see Baxter & Hopper, supra note 33, at 74-100 (an accurate de-
scription of the daily struggles faced by the homeless). Homeless persons internal-
ize their dilemma, and "feel that they have somehow failed, because our system
stresses independence and individual responsibility over our lives." Joe Neterval,
Viewing the Homeless in the "Right Light": MJF Attorney Member Experiences
"Homelessness," Pro Bono Rep., Sept./Oct., 1980, at 3, col. 2.
36. Cohen & Sokolovsky, supra note 21, at 220-21.
37. James K. Langdon, Jr. & Mark A. Kass, Homelessness in America: Looking
for the Right to Shelter, 19 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 305, 311 (1985); see Hopper,
Susser & Conover, supra note 4, at 14-15; see also Koch, The Federal Role in Aiding
the Homeless, in The Homeless in Contemporary Society 220-21 (1987); Ropers,
supra note 22, at 93-94; Cohen & Sokolovsky, supra note 21, at 57 (cites three fac-
tors: deinstitutionalization, economic decline, and decline of low-income housing).
[Vol. 9:279
1991] HOMELESSNESS
women with children.38 Although the first three factors increase
the likelihood that the mentally disabled, the unemployed, and
welfare recipients will become homeless, none of these factors
alone caused wide-spread homelessness. 39 Rather, the housing
shortage precipitated homelessness among the mentally disabled,
impoverished, and unemployed.40
The extent that deinstitutionalization of mentally disabled
patients contributed to homelessness is, at times, exaggerated.41
While the mentally disabled are the most visible segment of the
homeless population,42 homelessness amongst the mentally dis-
abled cannot be attributed to their deinstitutionalization.
Chronic homelessness among the mentally disabled devel-
oped years after deinstitutionalization.43 The mass release of
mental patients occurred after the introduction of psychotropic
drugs in the early 1960s. Reformers planned to place patients in
private homes, but those facilities never materialized.44 Thus,
"[d]einstitutionalization in itself is not responsible for the presence
of chronically mentally disabled individuals on the streets. Rather,
it is the result of the lack of resources [such as housing] dedicated
38. Richard Appelbaum & John Gilderbloom, Supply-Side Economics and
Rents" Are Rental Markets Truly Competitive?, in Critical Perspectives on Housing,
supra note 5, at 169.
39. See Swanstrom, supra note 10, at 84-85. "The poverty rate was higher in
previous periods, such as the 1950s, yet homelessness was never the acute problem
that it is today." Id. at 84; see also Metropolitan Council, supra note 22, at 6; Cohen
& Sokolovsky, supra note 21, at 60-61.
40. The federal government seized upon deinstitutionalization because it rein-
forces their characterization of the homeless as the "undeserving poor." "One way
to salvage the personal pathology explanation is to argue that the number of indi-
viduals with personal pathologies did not suddenly increase, but the number of
them on the street did. In other words, the deinstitutionalization of mental pa-
tients caused homelessness." Swanstrom, supra note 10, at 83.
41. Ropers, supra note 22, at 112-14.
While it is undoubtedly true that most homeless persons suffer from
the psychological distress of being homeless, empirical studies have
demonstrated that only a minority of the homeless are deinstitutional-
ized chronic mental patients or are currently suffering from a chronic
mental illness that causes them to be homeless ....
... Unfortunately, in the view of many health professionals and
the lay public, the term "homeless" has too often come to mean men-
tally ill.
Id. at 113-14 (citations omitted).
42. Neterval, supra note 35. Approximately thirty percent of the homeless suf-
fer from mental disability. National Coalition for the Homeless, supra note 18, at
72.
43. Hopper & Hamberg, supra note 5, at 15.
44. Sally S. Spector, Finding a Federal Forum: Using the Stewart B. McKinney
Homeless Assistance Act to Circumvent Federal Abstention Doctrines, 6 Law & Ine-
quality 273, 278-79 (1988). Originally, reformers envisioned that private care homes
would provide housing and continued treatment for the patients. Funding for the
homes, however, never materialized.
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to making community placement a workable reality."45 The lack
of low-income housing-particularly single-room occupancy hotels
(SROs)-forced released patients onto the streets. 46
Like deinstitutionalization, decreases in federal income assist-
ance are overly emphasized as a factor causing homelessness.
Shrinking federal assistance programs undermine the ability of
low-income individuals to afford housing, but cannot be credited as
the sole reason marginal groups find themselves on the streets.47
In the 1980s, the government relied upon privately sponsored re-
lief to provide housing for the indigent.48 Catastrophic cutbacks
in federal assistance crippled federal housing programs.49 Only
one-fourth of eligible low-income households received housing
assistance in 1987.50 Without sufficient low-income housing stock,
an income-based assistance program is futile.51
Underemployment among the homeless could also contribute
to the development of a permanent homeless underclass without
the creation of a sufficient stock of low-income housing. Deindus-
trialization, characterized by the loss of manufacturing and growth
of service jobs, contributed significantly to the rise of underem-
ployment as well as unemployment in the United States during
the 1970s and 1980s.5 2
Unemployment is not necessarily a characteristic of the
homeless anymore. The rise in employed persons living in the
streets is a sobering development in the homelessness crisis. The
"proliferation of low-wage service jobs" decreases the ability of the
poor working class to afford any type of housing.5 3 Significantly,
twenty to thirty percent of the homeless are employed but do not
45. Metropolitan Council, supra note 22, at 6.
46. Hopper & Hamberg, supra note 5, at 17.
47. Swanstrom, supra note 10, at 84 (cites falling AFDC benefits and termina-
tion of disability payments); United States Conference of Mayors, supra note 30, at
26.
48. Koch, supra note 37, at 222, 225.
49. Spector, supra note 44, at 278-79. 'The House Committee on Banking, Fi-
nance and Urban Affairs has identified the decrease in federal, state and local so-
cial service funding as one of the major causes of homelessness in the United
States." Id, at 278 n.24; see Ropers, supra note 22, at 116.
50. Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University, supra note 12, at
Exhibit 21. "[O]nly 2.1 million (or twenty-eight percent) of the nation's 7.5 million
poverty-level renter households lived in public housing or other subsidized rental
housing last year." Id
51. National Low Income Housing Preservation Commission, Preventing the
Disappearance of Low Income Housing 13-15 (1988).
52. See supra note 4; Ropers, supra note 22, at 100-101. 'The homeless all have
different stories, but many have a common theme. They either do not have ade-
quate life skills or have not been able to switch from a manufacturing to a service
job, making them unemployable." Neterval, supra note 35, at 3, col. 3.
53. Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University, supra note 12, at
[Vol. 9:279
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earn enough to afford permanent shelter.54
While deinstitutionalization, shrinking federal assistance, and
unemployment helped to create a vulnerable population, the most
significant cause of homelessness is the lack of housing. The
dimensions of the shortage are daunting. In 1980, for example,
"[there were] twice as many households with incomes below $5,000
as there [were] affordable units in the housing inventory." 5 His-
torically, federal intervention in the private housing industry and
implementation of public housing programs evolved from private
industry's inability (or unwillingness) to provide adequate housing
to low-income persons.58 Despite mixed policy motives, poor plan-
ning and implementation, and insufficient subsidies for public
housing, the government implemented an array of successful fed-
erally assisted housing programs.5 7 These programs provided sig-
nificant housing for low-income persons from the 1930s to the
early 1970s.58
The Nixon administration's moratorium on public housing in
the early 1970s signaled the beginning of a private sector oriented
housing policy.59 In the late 1970s and 1980s, chronic shortages of
low-income housing displaced deinstitutionalized mental patients,
unemployed and minimum wage workers, and even those receiv-
ing federal housing assistance.60 Federal response to the depletion
Exhibits 8, 10, 11 and accompanying text; see also Cohen & Sokolovsky, supra note
32, at 60.
54. National Coalition for the Homeless, supra note 18, at 72.
55. Cushing N. Dolbeare, Federal Housing Assistance: Who Needs It? Who
Gets It? 17 (1985).
56. J. Paul Mitchell, The Historical Context for Housing Policy, in Federal
Housing Policy & Programs: Past and Present 6-8 (1985). Industry can build low-
income housing when it is in its own interest to do so. Company towns, built in the
19th and early 20th centuries by copper, coal, and lumber companies, show that en-
tire communities can be privately funded. James B. Allen, The Company Town in
the American West 79-93 (1966). For a description of private industry's role in pro-
viding low-income housing, see generally Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier-
The Suburbanization of the United States (1985).
57. National Low Income Housing Preservation Commission, supra note 51, at
15-20. Federal housing units included 1,400,000 public housing units, 1,950,000 pri-
vately owned and subsidized units, and 813,000 § 8 Existing/Voucher units. Id. at 17,
Exhibits 1-3; see also Rachel Bratt, Public Housing: The Controversy and Contribu-
tion, in Critical Perspectives on Housing, supra note 5, at 336-42 (giving an histori-
cal overview of housing).
58. Bratt, supra note 57, at 354. 'There is no question that public housing has
made a considerable contribution to addressing the low-income housing problem in
this country. Millions of low-income families are provided with decent affordable
units .... I Id,
59. Eugene J. Meehan, The Evolution of Public Housing Policy, in Federal
Housing Policy and Programs: Past and Present, supra note 56, at 305-6.
60. Cf Bach & Steinhagen, supra note 31, at 42 n.27 (fifty-five percent of New
York City's low-income individuals unable to locate suitable apartments under § 8
Law and Inequality [Vol. 9:279
of affordable housing stock erroneously focused on income defi-
ciencies, and arose from a devout faith in the powers of the private
market.
Housing-a necessity of life-is treated not as a social good but
as a source of private profit, as a commodity .... Government
policies affecting housing . .. systematically operate to rein-
force the profitability of the housing sector and of the business
community as a whole.61
The private market theory animating this conservative public pol-
icy fails to take into account the crucial role that subsidized hous-
ing plays in sheltering low-income individuals. Thus, low-income
housing is viewed as a private concern, leaving the poor at the
mercy of private interests.6 2
The private housing industry virtually stopped building low-
income housing in the 1980s,63 and the private owners of federally
subsidized low-income stock now threaten to convert their proper-
ties to market-rent use.64 The private sector's underwhelming per-
formance is not unexpected. The types of programs the private
housing industry is willing to support do not best serve the needs
of low-income persons, 65 but cater to the interests of "real estate
developers, builders, materials producers, mortgage lenders and
Existing Housing Program); see also Amherst H. Wilder Foundation, supra note 18,
at 5. The Committee on Government Operations concluded that "the scarcity of
low-income housing appears to be the main cause of homelessness. Poor people
simply cannot afford... [the] majority of available housing in the United States."
U.S. House, Committee on Government Relations 3 (1985).
61. Achtenberg & Marcuse, supra note 16, at 4.
62. Ropers, supra note 22, at 95.
63. Swanstrom, supra note 10, at 91-92. The construction industry did not col-
lapse. Instead, builders and developers concentrated on profitable, high-income
housing. Robert C. Lesser, The Future of Housing Depends on Adaptable Builders,
in Housing Supply & Affordability 68 (1983). In 1982, "over 300,000 new single-fam-
ily homes, 80,000 new condos, and 90,000 converted condos," were built. The U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) lower-income housing pro-
grams, which provide incentives to private industry to create low-income housing,
resulted in only 119,000 housing starts in 1983. Hartman, supra note 7, at 364. The
"average" home is far beyond the means of the poor. In 1987, the average price for
a house was $66,886 in the United States, and the average income of homeowners
was $31,400, compared to $15,200 for renters. Joint Center for Housing Studies of
Harvard University, supra note 12, at app. table 1; see also Nina Gruen, Claude
Gruen & Wallace F. Smith, Living Space: Households in the 1980s, in Housing Sup-
ply & Affordability, supra, at 61, 65 (Table 2).
64. See National Low Income Housing Preservation Commission, supra note 51,
at 1-3. These privately owned buildings are subsidized by HUD and insured by the
Federal Housing Administration (FHA) under the § 221(d)(3) Below Market Inter-
est Rate Program (BMIR), § 221(d)(3) Market Rate Program with rental assistance,
and the § 236 Program. Id, at 1. See infra notes 154, 196, 204, 222 and accompanying
text.
65. Rachel Bratt, Public Housing: The Controversy and Contribution, in Criti-
cal Perspectives on Housing, supra note 5, at 342.
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other providers of housing credit, investors, speculators, landlords,
and homeowners."66 Simply stated, low-income housing is not
profitable enough to interest the private sector.67 Large nationally
oriented builders dominate the housing industry.68 Detached from
local communities' housing needs, these large housing companies
construct housing that is profitable,69 rather than responsive to so-
cial needs.
Conservatives argue that, despite the housing industry's dis-
interest in low-income housing construction, adequate affordable
housing should be provided as high-income persons move into
newly constructed housing. Unfortunately, theory is not reality.
Market imperfections, caused in part by the deregulation and col-
lapse of the savings and loan (S&L) industry, and by a dual cycle
of gentrification and abandonment in deteriorated inner-city
66. Achtenberg & Marcuse, supra note 17, at 5. Ironically, the private housing
industry simultaneously opposes federal housing programs, such as public housing
Throughout its half-century of existence public housing has failed to
capture the public's fancy. On the national level it has always encoun-
tered fierce opposition from well-organized lobbying groups. Organiza-
tions such as the National Association of Real Estate Boards and the
United States Savings League have consistently attacked public hous-
ing as a socialistic program which threatens private enterprise with
unfair competition from the public sector.
J. Paul Mitchell, Historical Overview of Direct Federal Housing Assistance, in Fed-
eral Housing Policy & Programs: Past and Present, supra note 56, at 196; see, e.g.,
U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Banking and Currency, Excerpts
from Legislative Hearings for the Housing Act of 1934, reprinted in Federal Hous-
ing Policy & Programs: Past and Present, supra note 84, at 66-67 (statement of Na-
tional Association of Real Estate Boards' President, Hugh Potter).
67. Siebert, supra note 17, at 395. "[U]nsubsidized new construction or substan-
tial rehabilitation of low-income housing is not economically feasible." Michel Car-
liner, Homelessness: A Housing Problem?, in The Homeless in Contemporary
Society, supra note 37, at 121.
68. The housing industry underwent a metamorphosis following World War I.
Large residential builders replaced small, local builders and developers. Barry
Checkoway, Large Builders Federal Housing Programs, and Postwar Suburbaniza-
tion, in Critical Perspectives on Housing, supra note 5, at 121-23. In 1938, large
builders built five percent of new housing units, but by 1959, they accounted for
sixty-four percent of all new housing units started. Id. at 123. The housing indus-
try is currently dominated by:
(1) major industrials, conglomerates, and multi product companies
whose housing interests are only a small portion of their overall
enterprise;
(2) vertically integrated companies that participate in the shelter
trade from forest to financing;,
(3) large merchant builders (also called operative builders); and
(4) mobile-home manufacturers ....
Tom Schlesinger & Mark Erlich, Housing: The Industry Capitalism Didn't Forget,
in Critical Perspectives on Housing, supra note 5, at 145-46.
69. See Schlesinger & Erlich, supra note 68, at 152-53 (large builders charge one
and one half times more than small builders for development); see, e.g., Howard
Rudnitsky, Squeezing the Builders, Forbes, Apr. 30, 1990, at 152, col. 1.
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neighborhoods, cut off the flow of low-income housing during the
1980s. 70
The thrift (S&L) industry sponsored a majority of the Fed-
eral Housing Administration (FHA)71 and Veterans Administra-
tion (VA)72 home mortgages from the 1950s through the early
1980s.73 The S&L industry's structure, however, was flawed be-
cause "it was a business in which one borrowed at short-term rates
through deposits, but in which loans, at least those made before
1980, were long-term, thirty-year fixed-rate mortgages that did not
adjust as inflation went up."74 Inflation in the 1960s led to the
commercialization of thrifts which, in turn, left thrifts vulnerable
to corporate takeovers.7 5 A second period of inflation in the late
1970s and early 1980s gave birth to deregulation of the S&L indus-
try and its catastrophic consequences.76
Thrift restructuring in the 1960s and deregulation in 1982
spurred thrifts to expand outside of the mortgage industry, leading
70. See inifra notes 71-90 and accompanying text.
71. National Housing Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-0479, 48 Stat. 1246 (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1701 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)). "FHA mortgage insurance
established as a standard the long-term, level-payment, low-interest mortgage
which, in turn, made ownership accessible to most Americans." Lawrence Simons,
Overview: Housing Options for the 1990 Toward a New National Housing Policy,
6 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 259, 262 (1988). HUD took over administration of the FHA
mortgage program upon its creation. Department of Housing & Urban Develop-
ment Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 3535 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
72. Serviceman's Readjustment Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-346, ch. 268, 58 stat.
284.
73. S&Ls held 24.14% of total residential mortgage debt outstanding in 1950; its
market share subsequently increased. In 1981, S&Ls held 40.53% of the residential
mortgage debt market. The President's Commission on Housing, The Changing
System of Housing Finance, in Housing- Supply & Affordability, supra note 63, at
125 (Table 1). See id at 123-26 for an excellent overview of the mortgage industry.
The demand for mortgage credit far exceeded supply even before the S&L industry
collapsed. Dwight Jaffee & Kenneth Rosen, The Demand for Housing and Mort-
gage Credit- The Mortgage Credit Gap Problem, in Housing. Supply and Af-
fordability, supra at 133 (Table 5).
74. William Black, Current State of the Savings and Loan Industry, 58 Anti-
trust L.J. 497 (1989).
75. Ann Meyerson, Housing Abandonment- The Role of Institutional Mortgage
Lenders, in Critical Perspectives on Housing, supra note 108, at 194-95 [hereinafter
Housing Abandonment]; see also Ann Meyerson, Deregulation and the Restructur-
ing of the Housing Finance System, in Critical Perspectives on Housing, supra at
68, 97 n.21 (Citicorp invaded mortgage industry to recoup losses on consumer
loans).
76. Joe Klein, It's a Wonderful Life: Behind the S&L Debacle, N.Y. Mag., Apr.
23, 1990, at 19, col. 1 (General Accounting Office estimated S&L scandal may cost
$500 billion). "[D]eregulation has ended the sheltered position of housing finance."
Swanstrom, supra note 10, at 89 ( citation omitted). Inflation pushed interest rates
to astronomical heights in the early 1980s-deregulation freed S&Ls to adjust their
investments. See generally Black, supra note 5, at 497-504. Joint Center for Hous-
ing Studies of Harvard University, supra note 12, at app. table 1.
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to disinvestment in cities.77 The S&L crisis debilitates low and
moderate income investors by taking away financing for rehabilita-
tion and creation of housing. Withdrawal of financial support
from institutions caused investors to abandon their property,7 8 and
low and moderate income investors lost their primary source of
building capital in the S&L crisis.79
Gentrification,8 0 insidiously destroys affordable housing stock
in the guise of revitalizing urban centers. Gentrification encour-
ages investors to convert abandoned housing into luxury apart-
ments and condos, and to abandon low-income housing which is no
longer profitable. Although gentrification arises from a strong de-
mand for housing, abandonments' is both a cause and effect of the
gentrified inner-city.8 2 "Abandonment drives some higher-income
households out of the city, while it drives others to gentrifying ar-
eas close to downtown. Abandonment also drives lower-income
households to adjacent areas, where pressures on housing and
rents are increased."8 3 Abandonment, in turn, displaces low-in-
come households and puts additional stress upon neighboring
77. Housing Abandonment, supra note 75, at 190; see also Ropers, supra note
22, at 94-95.
78. Housing Abandonment, supra note 75, at 193. Profit motivates market ac-
tivity and "the decision on the part of institutional lenders not to grant mortgages
in an area or to force more stringent and higher-cost terms when loans come due
causes owners to reevaluate their holdings radically." Id. at 192.
79. Meyerson, supra note 75, at 74 ("housing will permanently suffer the loss of
a cheap pool of money for mortgages"). The Federal Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery & Enforcement Act of 1989 (FFIRREA) places restrictions upon the
amount of loans a thrift can offer (fifteen percent of thrift's capital), further limit-
ing funding for builders. Rudnitsky, supra note 69.
80. Gentrification occurs:
[w]hen new residents--who disproportionately are young, white, pro-
fessional, technical, and managerial workers with higher education
and income levels-replace older residents-who disproportionately
are low-income, working-class, and poor, minority and ethnic group
members, and elderly-from older and previously deteriorated inner-
city housing in a spatially concentrated manner, that is, to a degree
differing substantially from the general level of change in the commu-
nity or region as a whole.
Peter Marcuse, Gent,-fication, Abandonment and Displacement Connections,
Causes, and Policy Responses in New York City, 28 J. Urb. & Contemp. L. 195, 198-
99 (1985).
81. This article adopts the following definition of abandonment:
Abandonment of a unit occurs when all those having a private profit-
oriented economic interest in a unit lose any incentive for continued
ownership beyond the immediate future, and are willing to surrender
title to it without compensation, because of the absence of effective de-
mand for its continued use or reuse.
Id. at 199-200.
82. See id. at 208-22 (study of effects of gentrification and abandonment in New
York City in 1981).
83. Id. at 196.
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rental markets.8 4
Gentrification appeared to resolve the dilemma of urban
blight in its nascent stages because it was associated with stimulat-
ing the economy and improving the value of property.s5 Uneasi-
ness over displaced blue-collar residents was brushed aside by
assurances that displacement "did not appear to cause significant
hardship among those forced to move."8 6
Gentrification also causes abandonment because profits from
the conversion of low-income rental property to condominiums
and luxury apartments encourage the abandonment of low-income
housing by developers and landlords.8 7 Consequently, low-income
housing stocks dwindle because affordable units are not profitable
to replace.8s
Gentrifying inner-city areas not only displaces the poor, it
also polarizes individuals by race and income.8 9 "A vicious circle is
created in which the poor are continuously under pressure of dis-
placement and the well-to-do continuously seek to wall themselves
in within [sic] gentrified neighborhoods."90
The profit-oriented private building industry's vulnerability
to economic turns, as evidenced by the collapse of the S&L indus-
try and by the gentrification of poor neighborhoods, contributes di-
rectly to the depletion of low-income housing; to displacement; and
to homelessness. The experience of the 1980s shows that the solu-
tion to the homeless dilemma cannot be expected to come from
the private sector.
84. The term "displacement" includes a multitude of circumstances, such as di-
rect off-site displacement, exclusionary displacement, chain displacement, blocked
displacement, and anticipatory displacement. Peter Marcuse & R. Rasmussen, Off-
Site Displacement How the Changing Economic Tide of a Neighborhood Can
Drawn Out the Poor, 22 Clearinghouse Rev. 1352, 1356-57 (Apr. 1989). An inclusive
definition of displacement is adopted in this article:
Displacement occurs when, as a result of a given action, the continued
or new occupancy of a unit is made, or is reasonably expected to be-
come, impossible, hazardous, unaffordable, or socially untenable, for a
household that, but for that action, would occupy that unit.
Id. at 1357.
85. David Listokin, Living Cities 67 (1985).
86. I& at 71.
87. Siebert, supra note 17, at 395. Inclusionary zoning ordinances would require
creation of replacement housing by private developers, but most local governments
have not adopted them. George Sternlieb & David Listokin, A Review of National
Housing Policy, in Housing America's Poor 36-38 (Peter Salins ed. 1987).
88. Siebert, supra note 17, at 395. The desirability of single room occupancies
(SROs) as permanent housing for low-income persons is questionable. See Ropers,
supra note 22, at 187.
89. Peter Marcuse, Abandonmen4 Gentrification, and Displacement: The Link-
ages in New York City, in Gentrification of the City 169 (1986).




Moribund federal housing policies prompted judicial and
state/local governmental efforts to alleviate homelessness, but
structural and fiscal limitations constrain their effectiveness. 91
The courts provide minimal relief to homeless persons, rejecting
both constitutional and statutory bases for the right to shelter.92
Moreover, courts are unwilling to impose expensive shelter sys-
tems upon state governments.93 State efforts vary dramatically ac-
cording to political ideology, but even comprehensive state
programs cannot provide sufficient emergency assistance, much
less permanent low-income housing.94
A. Judicial
According to the courts, there is no right to shelter. Claims
based upon the United States Constitution have been unsuccessful
in securing a right to housing for the poor. The Supreme Court re-
fuses to recognize poverty as a suspect classification or to identify
housing as an entitlement.9 5
In Dandridge v. Williams, the Supreme Court held that a
Maryland regulation, imposing a $250 per month ceiling on an
AFDC grant regardless of actual need and family size, did not vio-
late the equal protection clause.9 6 The Court determined that
socio-economic interests do not fall within the scope of protection
created by the equal protection clause. As a result, the Court ap-
plied the rational basis standard to the legislation.97
In William v. Barry, the District Court for the Federal Dis-
91. See infra notes 95-127 and accompanying text.
92. See infra notes 95-107 and accompanying text.
93. Langdon & Kass, supra note 37, at 346.
94. See infra notes 120-127 and accompanying text.
95. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); Lindsey v. Normet, 341 F. Supp.
638 (D.Or. 1970), affd in par4 rev'd in part, 405 U.S. 56 (1972). Justice White, in
his opinion for Lindsey states:
We do not denigrate the importance of decent, safe, and sanitary hous-
ing. But the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for every
social and economic ill. We are unable to perceive in that document
any constitutional guarantee of access to dwellings of a particular qual-
ity .... Absent constitutional mandate, the assurance of adequate
housing... [is a] legislative, not [a] judicial function.
405 U.S. at 74.
96. 397 U.S. at 486. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
97. In the area of economics and social welfare, a state does not violate
the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made
by its laws are imperfect. If the classification has some "reasonable
basis," it does not offend the Constitution simply because the classifi-
cation "is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it
results in some inequality."
Id. at 485 (citing Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911)).
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trict of Columbia held that a state could close its homeless shelters
because the homeless do not have a property interest in shelter.9 8
Shelter, as it is currently construed by the courts, is a gift and not
an entitlement. Consequently, courts uphold state actions absent
specific statutory or constitutional provisions.99 Even when judi-
cial relief is granted, the inherent limitations of the judicial system
detract from its ability to assist the homeless. Limitations such as
"the shortage of legal service, the barrier of justiciability, the time
required to litigate an issue, and the difficulties faced in imple-
menting and enforcing a remedy," 0 0  contribute to judicial
ineffectiveness.
Although most states enacted "general assistance" statutes,
courts are reluctant to interpret such statutes liberally to create a
duty to provide shelter.' 0 ' Three state courts (New York, West
Virginia, and New Jersey), however, found a duty to provide ade-
quate shelter based on mental health and public assistance stat-
utes.'0 2 In Maticka v. City of Atlantic City, the Superior Court of
New Jersey held that "the prevention of homelessness is a neces-
sary governmental function, at least when all private resources
have proved unavailing,"' 03 and directed the state to revise its
AFDC administrative procedures to comply with due process re-
quirements. 0 4 The West Virginia Supreme Court in Hodge v.
Ginsberg construed the term "incapacitated adult" contained in
the Department of Welfare's enabling act to include indigent per-
sons,105 thereby entitling homeless persons to state relief. Simi-
larly, the Massachusetts Supreme Court established a right to
shelter based upon state and federal law and policy.' 0 6 Although
the recognition of a right to shelter in these states is encouraging,
98. No. CV-80-1104 (D.C. June 8, 1982). See Siebert, supra note 17, at 405.
99. Robbins v. Reagan, 616 F. Supp. 1259 (D.D.C. 1985) affd in part, 780 F.2d 37
(D.C.Cir. 1985); Caton v. Barry, 500 F. Supp. 45 (D.D.C. 1980); see Siebert, supro
note 17, at 404-5.
100. Langdon & Kass, supra note 37, at 345.
101. Id. at 325-32.
102. Callahan v. Carey, No. 42582-79 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. filed Oct. 2, 1979); Eldredge v.
Koch, 118 Misc.2d 163, 459 N.Y.S.2d 960 (Sup. Ct.), rev'd on other grounds, 98
A.D.2d 675, 469 N.Y.S.2d 744 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983); Hodge v. Ginsberg, 303 S.E.2d
245 (W. Va. 1983); Maticka v. City of Atlantic City, 216 N.J. Super. 434, 524 A.2d 416
(1987).
103. 216 N.J. Super. 434, 524 A.2d at 425.
104. Id. at 428.
105. 303 S.E.2d at 250. "[IThe term 'incapacitated adult' contained in W. Va.
Code § 9-6-1 was intended by the Legislature to encompass indigent persons ...
who, by reason of the recurring misfortunes of life, are unable to independently
carry on the daily activities of life necessary to sustaining life and reasonable
health." Id.




other states have not followed suit.o 7
Explicit constitutional provisions would give courts authority
to find a right to shelter, but only six state constitutions have lan-
guage requiring the needs of the poor to be met.108 A state's role
in providing shelter varies dramatically as a result of these specific
constitutional provisions. 0 9
B. State Programs
State responses to the homeless vary. A few states deny that
homelessness is a problem, while other states are openly hostile to
the homeless.110 A number of states are responding with exten-
sive programs that attempt to provide both emergency relief and
long-term shelter."' Few states have comprehensive housing pro-
107. Langdon & Kass, supra note 37, at 327. For excellent overviews of the tri-
umphs and limits of judicial activism in housing the homeless, see Robert Coates,
Legal Rights of Homeless Americans, 24 U.S.F. L. Rev. 297 (1990); Hopper, supra
note 3.
108. Langdon & Kass, supra note 37, at 333-34. Mont. Const. art. 12, § 3(3); Tex.
Const. art. XI, § 2; Ala. Const. art. IV, § 88; Okla. Const. art. 17, § 3; Kan. Const. art.
7, § 4; N.Y. Const. art. XVII, § I (New York legislation proposed amendment to
Constitution which will specifically provide homeless with right to shelter, N.Y.
Const. art. XVIII, § 1). Other state constitutions that could provide support for
statutory relief programs are: Ind. Const. art. 9, § 3; Mich. Const. art. 4, § 51; Miss.
Const. art. 14, § 262, art. 4, § 86; Mo. Const. art. 4, § 37; N.C. Const. art. XI, § 4; S.C.
Const. art. XII, § 1; Colo. Const. art. XXIV, § 3; Ga. Const. art. IX, § 4, para. 2; Haw.
Const. art. IX, § 3; Idaho Const. art. X, § 1; Nev. Const. art. 13, § 1(1).
109. See, e.g., Governor Mario M. Cuomo, The State Role, in The Homeless in
Contemporary Society, supra note 37, at 295-313; see also Marsha Ritzdorf & Sum-
ner Sharpe, Portland, Oregon: A Comprehensive Approach, in The Homeless in
Contemporary Society, supra note 37, at 186.
110. Arizona, Florida, and Michigan enacted legislation hostile to the homeless.
Langdon & Kass, supra note 37, at 322 n.91. The Arizona and Florida legislatures,
however, recently passed legislation to assist the homeless. H.B. 2177, 39th Leg. 2d
Sess., 1990 Ariz. ch. 315; Fla. Stat. § 288.1166 (1989).
111. New Jersey, for example, enacted the New Jersey Prevention of Homeless-
ness Act in addition to programs for emergency shelter. The program aids families
on the brink of eviction; the law provides:
(e) To provide rental assistance grants to persons of low or moderate
income to enable them to pay the fair market value for housing units.
(f) To provide loans and grants of temporary rental or other tempo-
rary housing assistance to persons without housing or in imminent
danger of losing housing as a result of having insufficient income from
other sources to allow payment of the rental or other housing costs.
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 52:27C-24 (West 1984).
New York, California, and Massachusetts also have many faceted state pro-
grams. Mass. Gen. L. Ch. 450 (1987); Cal. Gov't Code § 15299 (West 1987); Cal. Gov't
Code § 15290 (1990); Cal. Gov't Code § 53150 (West 1990); N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 41
(McKinney 1987). Governor Mario M. Cuomo, supra note 109, at 207:
First, we have tried to ensure that decent shelter is available to all
who need it. Second, we have expanded our efforts to meet the needs
of special dependent populations, especially the needs of those on the
street and in shelters and those in need of community-based supported
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grams. 12 Although many states' "[sItatutory and constitutional
provisions appear to require [these] states to provide shelter and
assistance" to the homeless, only a few states "have acknowledged
such an obligation.""l 3
Placing responsibility to provide housing entirely on states is
dangerous. Some states effectively ostracize their homeless popu-
lation. Florida, for example, has ranked near the bottom in its
public services expenditures.114 Florida municipalities have either
denied the existence of homelessness or blamed the homeless,
claiming that they did not deserve assistance.115 State and local of-
ficials characterized the homeless in Florida as transients and va-
grants."i6 Relief efforts originated primarily from private and
county programs, and focused on supplying only emergency re-
lief."it The rationale underlying Florida's response to its homeless
population derives directly from a prevailing conservative ideol-
ogy.118 Such state indifference and hostility exacerbates homeless-
housing .... Fifth, we have begun ambitious programs to develop
much needed low- and moderate-income housing.
ICE
112. States regulate, facilitate, and subsidize housing. This article focuses upon
funding an affordable housing industry, but states also control housing stocks
through zoning and land use regulations and taxes. David Berger, Dale Bertsch,
John Bowman & Marlene Shaul, The Role of State Government in Affordable
Housing, in Housing- Supply & Affordability, supra note 63, at 168-72. The types of
programs undertaken by states include financial assistance for: new construction/
substantial rehabilitation, rehabilitation/conservation/preservation, tenants, home-
owners, predevelopment costs, temporary/special housing needs, and land acquisi-
tion and/or development. Council of State Community Affairs Agencies, State
Housing Initiatives: A Compendium, 1986, at 11-71 (1986). See id for descriptions
of individual projects implemented in forty-two states. For a discussion of the nega-
tive impact of zoning and land use laws on homeless people, see Katherine Devers
& J. Gardner West, Exclusionary Zoning and its F&ffect on Housing Opportunities
for the Homeless, 4 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 349 (1989).
113. Langdon & Kass, supra note 37, at 334.
114. Doug Timmer & J. D. Knottnerus, Homeless in Florida, in 1 Homelessness
in the United States 39 (1989). "Mhe public dollars that could support research on
the homeless as well as services to them have been virtually nonexistent." Id.
115. Id. at 40-41. Local hostility toward the homeless is shown in local ordi-
nances. For example, in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, a city councilperson suggested
spraying garbage cans with poison to prevent the homeless from scavenging. Lang-
don & Kass, supra note 37, at 323 n.91 (citation omitted).
116. Id. at 42, 55. (In 1984, approximately 22,650 to 25,740 people did not have
shelter in Florida)
117. Id. at 55; see id. at 47-55 for description of individual metropolitan
programs.
118. Id. at 39.
[A] very conservative political climate prevails in Florida, which cre-
ates a tendency for state and local officials, busily hustling developers,
and investors from outside the state to deny the reality of serious so-
cial problems like homelessness .... [I]n regard to all manner of pub-
lic service expenditures, Florida consistently ranks at or near the
bottom of all 50 states.
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ness by punishing the victim. Some states, for example, have
passed vagrancy laws and arbitrary zoning codes in a vain effort to
eliminate the homeless crisis by removing the homeless from their
communities.119
Most states are only beginning to implement policies to com-
bat homelessness. As a result, many lack comprehensive shelter
services.12 0 Frequently, state sponsored programs approach home-
lessness in a piecemeal fashion, preserving some low-income hous-
ing' 21 or providing emergency shelter.'=2  All states rely upon
private organizations to provide assistance to the homeless.2 3
Without federal guidance and funding, assistance to the homeless
develops haphazardly, depending upon the resources and/or polit-
ical agenda of individual states.124
Political pressures limit state efforts to help the homeless.
State and local policy-makers believe that state and locally imple-
mented homeless assistance programs will attract non-resident, in-
digent people to the area, thereby escalating the homeless crisis.'=5
As a result of these beliefs, state programs overwhelmingly pro-
vide transitional or temporary housing. Preservation efforts focus
upon the worst low-income housing, such as single room occupancy
Id.
119. Langdon & Kass, supra note 37, at 322.
120. Id. at 305, "[iost local governments provide no shelter for homeless per-
sons. Of those that do, not one has facilities adequate for the needs of its homeless
population." Id.; see also Gerald Blake & Martin Abbott, Homelessness in the Pa-
cific Northwest, in Homelessness in the United States, supra note 114, at 178; Hazel
Morrow-Jones & Willem van Vliet, Homelessness in Colorado, in Homelessness in
the United States, supra note 128, at 32.
121. Allen Heskin, Los Angeles: Innovative Local Approaches, in The Homeless
in Contemporary Society, supra note 37, at 174-77; see also Metropolitan Council,
supra note 22, at 10.
122. Cal. Gov't Code § 15290 (West 1987); Cal. Gov't Code § 8698 (West 1987);
Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 13500 (West 1987); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 127, para. 46.38a
(1988); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 8101 (1989); Md. Code Ann. § 132 (1985); Mass.
Gen. L. ch. 117.5, § 117.5a (1987); Mich. Comp. Laws § 400.14(a) (1987); N.J. Rev.
Stat. § 55-13c (1988); N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 41 (McKinney 1987); N.Y. Soc. Serv.
Law § 131(1), (3) (McKinney 1987); N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 62 (McKinney 1987); W.
Va. Code § 31-18-3 (1989); Wash. Rev. Code § 43.185 (1987).
123. Koch, supra note 37, at 222; "The vast majority of efforts to assist the
homeless have always been undertaken by the private sector, including business,
churches, non-profit groups, and voluntary organizations. [An] HUD study found
that over ninety percent of all shelters are privately run." Id.; see also Langdon &
Kass, supra note 37, at 318.
124. See, e.g., Timmer & Knottnerus, supra note 114, at 39. But see Cuomo,
supra note 109, at 207.
125. See Langdon & Kass, supra note 37, at 322 n.91. "At all levels of govern-
ment, even when officials perceive pressing need, they fear that implementing crea-
tive programs will attract more homeless people to the area." Metropolitan
Council, supra note 22, at 22.
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hotels (SROs).126 Ultimately, state programs probably cannot re-
place housing lost due to federal housing cutbacks because of the
overwhelming nature of the housing shortage and states' lack of fi-
nancial resources. 7
C. Federal Policies and Programs
The federal government accepted responsibility for providing
low-income housing during the Great Depression with the passage
of the National Housing Act of 1934.128 Historically, federal pro-
grams used supply-side measures to provide low-income hous-
ing.129 Clearly, housing poor people ranks as a secondary
126. See, e.g., Ritzdorf & Sharpe, supra note 109, at 195-96 (twelve point program
in Portland, Oregon that relied heavily upon existing housing stock, such as SROs
and welfare hotels).
127. By and large, housing assistance does not come cheaply. The anxiety
over financing is probably a major reason why states hesitate to be-
come involved in housing. No matter how aggressive states become in
housing collectively they are unlikely to replace the federal cutbacks,
whether that amount is $10 billion or $30 billion.
Council of State Community Affairs Agencies, supra note 112, at 8 (emphasis
added).
128. National Housing Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-0479, 48 Stat. 1246 (codified as
amended 12 U.S.C. § 1701 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
129. For an excellent overview of the history of national housing policy, see
Simons, supra note 71, at 262-68. According to Simons, "[t]he federal government
attempted to increase the supply of housing through mortgage insurance to facili-
tate the development of market rate housing, through tax policy favoring home-
ownership, and through subsidy mechanisms intended to provide shelter for
families the market would not otherwise serve." Id. at 262.
Programs implemented since the 1930s include: the FHA mortgage insurance
program, Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932, Pub. L. No. 72-304, 47 Stat. 725
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1421 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)) (transferred to the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) in 1965 under the Depart-
ment of Housing & Urban Development Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 3534 (1982 & Supp.
III 1985)); Fannie Mae, Federal National Mortgage Association, 12 U.S.C. § 1716
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986), and Freddie Mac, Federal Home Lien Mortgage Corpora-
tion, 12 U.S.C. § 1452 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986))(Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac estab-
lished a secondary market for mortgages); Ginnie Mae, Government National
Mortgage Association, 12 U.S.C. § 1716b (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)(Ginnie Mae guaran-
tees mortgage-backed securities that generate funds for mortgages insured under
the FHA and VA). The United States Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (1982
& Supp. III 1985), authorized the construction of federally subsidized low-income
housing.
In addition to mortgage insurance, tax policies encouraged developers to invest
in low income housing. The Tax Reform Act of 1986, 26 U.S.C. 1 "repealed tax in-
centives specifically designed to encourage low-income housing production... " Ja-
net Stearns, The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit A Poor Solution to the Housing
Crisis, 6 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 203, 208 (1988). The Tax Reform Act repealed: (1)
accelerated depreciation, I.R.C. § 167(k) (CCH 1981); (2) full deductibility of con-
truction period interest, I.R.C. § 189 (CCH 1981)(repealed by Tax Reform Act,
§ 803(b)(1); and, (3) special capital gains treatment, I.R.C. § 1039 (CCH 1981) (re-
pealed by Tax Reform Act, § 301). The Tax Reform Act "also restricted the issu-
ance of tax-exempt bonds, the proceeds of which could be loaned by local
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consideration in federal housing policy.' 30 Congress pursues other
goals, such as stimulating the economy, and attempts to create
low-income housing as a by-product of these goals.'13 Powerful
private interest groups operating on behalf of the private housing
industry, further constrain federal housing programs. The private
housing industry's lobbyists strenuously oppose federal public
housing programs, thereby limiting the construction and use of
public housing. 3 2
Nonetheless, federal programs expanded the nation's housing
stock. Over the past few decades, federal programs resulted in the
construction of more than four million subsidized rental units for
low-income persons. 33 Federally subsidized public housing cre-
ated approximately 1.9 million units.134 In 1980, 65.6 percent of
Americans owned their own homes135 due to long-term, low-rate
mortgages sponsored by the government. 3 6
governments to developers of low-income housing at below market interest rates,
[See I.R.C. §§ 14147 (1986)]." Id.
130. Peter Marcuse, Housing Policy and the Myth of the Benevolent State, in
Critical Perspectives on Housing, supra note 5, at 253.
131. Simons, supra note 71, at 262; see also Checkoway, supra note 99, at 129-34.
132. For a historical analysis of ways in which the private housing interests di-
rected housing policy, see Checkoway, supra note 99, at 127-31. The federal govern-
ment's ambivalence about its role in providing low-income housing undermines
federal programs' effectiveness. Programs tend to be inefficient, costly, bizarrely
inequitable or unpredictable. Peter Salins, Can We Ensure that All Americans Are
Well Housed?, in Housing America's Poor, supra note 87, at 177.
The housing industry's hostility toward federal public housing does not extend
to federal subsidy programs that benefit their interests. Urban renewal, which
owes its existence to the private housing industry's powerful lobbies, gives federal
subsidies to real estate developers through the government's sale of "cleared" slum
areas at substantial discounts. Urban renewal should not be confused with gentrifi-
cation; urban renewal is a federally subsidized program that can be an element in
the gentrification process. Although urban renewal and public housing seem
closely associated, urban renewal actually decreases low-income housing stock. The
program requires property to be residential before renewal, but does not require
developers to build residential units. As a result, low-income housing gives way to
office buildings, convention centers, and luxury apartments. Marc Weiss, The Ori-
gins and Legacy of Urban Renewal, in Federal Housing Policy & Programs: Past
and Present, supra note 56, at 255-71. Urban renewal's success proves that subsi-
dized "housing" programs do work with sufficient support and capital.
133. National Low Income Housing Preservation Commission, supra note 78, at
13.
134. Stearns, supra note 129, at 205.
135. Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University, supra note 22, at
Exhibit 16. Homeownership rates, however, fell throughout the 1980s. By 1987, the
number of households that owned their own homes fell by 1.6% to 64%. Id The
deregulation and subsequent collapse of the savings and loan industry, combined
with an increasingly polarized economy and declining actual salaries, contributed
directly to low- and moderate-income households' difficulty in achieving homeown-
ership. The income of homeowners rose significantly, while the median income of
renters fell. Id. at Exhibits 9, 10, 11 and accompanying text.
136. J. Paul Mitchell, Historical Overview of Federal Policy: Encouraging Home-
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Despite these tremendous achievements, disagreement over
the success of public housing and over the proper scope and means
of federal participation in the creation of public housing continues
to plague federal housing programs. In fact, this past decade wit-
nessed a full-scale retreat from federal commitment to the provi-
sion of adequate housing for all Americans. 13 7
During the first thirty years following the enactment of the
National Housing Act of 1937, the federal government concen-
trated upon supply-side programs, i.e., the creation of public hous-
ing through subsidies and tax incentives.i38 Public housing's
mounting economic inefficiencies, caused by inflation and the use
of tenants' rents to finance maintenance and repair of public hous-
ing (while tenants' incomes remained static), prompted reevalua-
tion of public housing in the late 1960s.13 9 Subsequently, federal
ownership in Federal Housing Policy & Programs: Past and Present, supra note 56,
at 39-43. Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932, 12 U.S.C. § 1421 (1982 & Supp.
1986).
137. For a description of a Reagan policy proposing cutbacks, see Chester Hart-
man, Housing Allowances. A Bad Idea Whose Time Has Come, in Federal Housing
Policy & Programs: Past and Present, supra note 56, at 384 [hereinafter Housing
Allowances].
Public housing and tax incentives to developers, rather than mortgage insur-
ance, remain controversial. Unlike most social reforms, public housing did not
clearly succeed or fail:
In the U.S., public attitudes about social security, collective bargaining,
and national economic controls have all followed the classic steps out-
lined years ago by George Bernard Shaw: 1) it's impossible; 2) it's
against the Bible; 3) it's too expensive; and 4) we knew it all along.
But public housing ... still drags along in a kind of limbo, continu-
ously controversial, not dead but never more than half alive.
Catherine Bauer, The Dreary Deadlock of Public Housing, in Federal Housing Pol-
icy & Programs: Past and Present, supra note 56, at 277. Public housing remains in
limbo, in part, because public housing projects suffer from poor design and manage-
ment, and the private housing industry vigorously lobbies against public housing.
Id. at 278-81.
138. Simons, supra note 71, at 262.
139. J. Paul Mitchell, The Historical Context for Public Housing, in Federal
Housing Policy & Programs: Past and Present, supra note 56, at 13-17 [hereinafter
Historical Context]. The shift from construction to housing vouchers began with
the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-117, 79 Stat. 451
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1701 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)). In 1970, the fed-
eral government conducted a pilot program, the Experimental Housing Allowance
Program (EHAP), to test the effectiveness of rent subsidies. Mitchell, supra note
66, at 201; see also Carty, supra note 24, at 379. The project analyzed the impact of
housing assistance on:
1) the quantity of housing services consumed by low-income house-
holds, 2) the supply of new or rehabilitated housing, 3) possible hous-
ing inflation, 4) household mobility, and 5) neighborhood upgrading,
among others." Mitchell, supra note 66, at 201. The project provided
30,000 families with rent vouchers in twelve cities across the country.
The project's findings, though mostly inconclusive, indicate that people
did not participate in the program when the government imposed stan-
dards for housing quality. "Very poor people, minorities, large fami-
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policy swung from a supply-side approach to a demand-side ap-
proach' 40 during the Nixon administration.141 The federal govern-
ment increasingly relied upon the private sector to construct low-
income housing throughout the 1970s and 1980s.142
Federal assistance for low-income housing from 1974 through
the early 1980s consisted of the Section 8 New Construction and
Substantial Rehabilitation and Moderate Rehabilitation programs
and the Section 8 Existing Housing program.143 The New Con-
struction and Substantial Rehabilitation program, which the Rea-
gan administration decommissioned in 1983,144 permitted local
communities to create low-income housing through owner subsi-
dies.145 The demise of Section 8 supply-side programs dramatically
diminished the federal government's direct participation in supply-
side creation of low-income housing.
Today, the Section 8 Existing Housing program, which pro-
vides rental vouchers to eligible low-income people for use in the
private housing market, is the major federal housing assistance
program.146 The program presumes that sufficient affordable
lies, and families living in substandard housing had the lowest
participation rates.
Housing Allowances, supra note 137, at 385.
140. A supply-side subsidy is paid to the owner who builds or operates a low- or
moderate-income housing project. A demand-side subsidy is paid directly to the
tenant and permits her to participate in the private market. Simons, supra note 71,
at 267.
141. 1d. at 266; see also Historical Context, supra note 139, at 16.
142. The Reagan administration, in particular, heralded the private sector as the
panacea of all societal ills, and asserted that, "It]he genius of a market economy,
freed of the distortions forced by government housing policies and regulations that
swung erratically from loving to hostile, can provide for housing far better than
Federal programs." Report of the President's Commission on Housing xvii (1982)
(quoted in Hartman, supra note 15, at 362-63).
Even public housing owned by the federal government increasingly became pri-
vately owned in the 1980s. The Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) sold "publicly owned and subsidized housing... to private developers, re-
quiring in return. only a commitment that such housing remain dedicated to low-
income persons for 15 years." Stearns, supra note 129, at 206 (citing 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1701z-1711). Conversion to private use threatens to remove these low-income
housing units from the affordable housing stock entirely. See infra note 222 and
accompanying text.
143. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. IL No. 93-383, 88
Stat. 633 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
144. Housing and Urban Rural Recovery Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-181, 97 Stat.
113 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (1982 & Supp. III 1985)). The § 8 Moderate Reha-
bilitation program is still in operation. 42 U.S.C. § 1437o (1985 & Supp. 1987).
145. Units built under the § 8 New Construction and Rehabilitation program
"dropped steadily in this decade: from 183,000 units in 1980 ... to an estimated
28,000 in 1985." Hartman, supra note 15, at 364.
146. Koch, supra note 37, at 226.
Because housing affordability is generally the problem, the Reagan
Administration has made the housing voucher program the corner-
Law and Inequality [Vol. 9:279
housing stock exists, and that lack of housing results from income
deficiencies. 47  Section 8 attempts to maximize economic effi-
ciency by promoting freedom of choice, by lifting geographic limi-
tations, and by eliminating middlemen from subsidized housing.148
If adequate housing stock did exist, the program would be an
attractive solution to the low-income housing crisis. Unfortu-
nately, adequate rental housing simply does not exist. As a result,
the Section 8 Existing Housing program fails to assist more than a
fraction of impoverished families.149 This demand-side program
has strict requirements: to be eligible, a family's income may not
exceed the median household income of an area; and Section 8
households cannot participate in the program if the unit cost ex-
ceeds the fair market rental value.15o Moreover, Congress slashed
federal housing expenditures during the 1980s,1 and a majority of
eligible families do not receive assistance.152
Ultimately, the Section 8 experience indicates that a demand-
side approach, even if properly funded, cannot succeed because it
is based upon incorrect assumptions about the rental market. In-
come deficiency is not the sole cause of the housing crisis--pov-
erty, discrimination, and the lack of housing stock are all to
blame.153 Any practical solution to the homeless crisis must ad-
stone of its assisted housing policy .... The housing voucher approach
recognizes that the private market provides an adequate supply of
rental housing for the nation.
Id.
147. Id. at 225-26.
148. Bernard J. Frieden, Housing Allowances: An Experiment that Worked, in
Federal Housing Policy and Programs: Past and Present, supra note 56, at 367.
149. For example, a study conducted by the Pratt Institute's Center for Commu-
nity and Environmental Development found that "36 percent of New York City
families given § 8 certificates were unable to use them because they couldn't find
decent vacant units. Minorities and families with children were least able to use
their certificates." Housing Allowances, supra note 137, at 386.
150. Simons, supra note 71, at 267; Carty, supra note 14, at 380.
151. Dolbeare, supra note 55, at 27-31 (Chart 9, Table 8). Budget authority for
low-income housing was $30.2 billion in 1980 but by 1986 the budget authority dwin-
dled to $0.5 billion. Id.
152. Simons, supra note 71, at 267. Housing and Community Development
Amendments of 1981, 42 U.S.C. 5301 (1981). Families are required to contribute
thirty percent of their income toward rent regardless of their income level. The § 8
program fails to meet the needs of all groups of low-income renters. For example,
in 1980, a mere sixteen percent of renter households below the poverty line lived in
subsidized housing (1,430,000 families out of 8,956,000 families). Dolbeare, supra
note 55, at 21 (Table 4). By 1987, there were 3,200,000 families below the poverty
line who did not receive any rental assistance. Simons, supra note 71, at 267, n.28.
153. The current administration's neglect and conversion of existing housing
stock and its refusal to subsidize construction of new public housing, coupled with
the inability of private developers to build low- and moderate-income housing is de-
stroying existing low-income housing without replacing it. See Ropers, supra note
22, at 95; Note, Reassessing Rent ControL" Its Economic Impact in a Gentjf~ying
1991] HOMELESSNESS
dress both income deficiencies and the lack of affordable
housing.154
Tax incentives, such as accelerated depreciation, special capi-
tal gains treatment, and deductions for construction period inter-
est, supplemented incentives created under Section 8.155 The Tax
Reform Act of 1986,156 however, repealed these tax incentives for
the construction of low-income housing. 5 7 The Low-Income
Housing Tax Credit,158 which Congress enacted within the Tax
Reform Act, replaced previous provisions as the predominant indi-
rect federal subsidy of low-income housing.159 The Low-Income
Housing Tax Credit gave investors credit for a percentage of their
investment in the construction, purchase, or rehabilitation of low-
Housing Market, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1835, 1847 (1988) [hereinafter Reassessing Rent
Control]. "In 1986, unsubsidized private developers produced only 30,600 units of
housing that rented for less than $300 per month." Simons, supra note 71, at 270.
Yet, even "[i]n 1983, the number of households in need of an apartment renting for
$250 per month increased to about 12 million while the number of units with such
rents decreased to nearly 9 million. Projections for the year 2003 show an ever
widening gap." National Low Income Housing Preservation Commission, supra
note 78, at 13-14. Clearly, "[w]ithout government subsidies, the construction of new
low-income units remains unprofitable," and "lost flow-income] units go largely un-
replaced." Reassessing Rent Control, supra, at 1839.
Even if sufficient low-income units existed, "[t]enant voucher and rent subsidy
programs depend on open rental markets and cannot operate successfully in com-
munities where racial discrimination or discrimination against families with chil-
dren limits the availability of housing." Simons, supra note 71, at 274. The article
cites a study which found that "more than three-quarters of minority and non-mi-
nority families that consist of both parents and more than four children and that
have § 8 rent certificates experience discrimination in finding housing." Id. Many
minority families could not find housing within the sixty day time limit. Id.
154. The Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 101-
645, - Stat. - (1990), does address both supply-side and demand-side deficiencies.
Many of its programs, however, are merely pilot projects and/or implement pro-
grams that do not remedy the affordable housing shortage. The Act implements a
new HOME Investment Partnerships program, a National Homeownership Trust
program, and Hope programs, and amends existing programs. The Act includes re-
vised mortgage programs, a new pilot urban homesteading program, and a new
housing preservation program. See infra notes 196, 204, 222, and accompanying
text.
155. Tax incentives, even with § 8 subsidies, did not inspire developers to con-
struct a lot of low-income housing in the 1980s. See supra note 145. These incen-
tives included "an election to amortize expenditures to rehabilitate low-income
housing over sixty months ... preferential treatment in calculating ACRS recov-
ery deductions ... [and] a quicker write-off of construction period interest and
taxes." Stanley Rier, Tax Ideas. Low-Income Housing-The Rest of the Story, 18
Real Estate L.J. 90 (1989).
156. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986). Congress
enacted the Tax Reform Act in response to public perception that the wealthy took
unfair advantage of tax shelters under the existing code. Stearns, supra note 129,
at 208.
157. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
158. I.R.C. § 42 (1986).
159. Stearns, supra note 129, at 209.
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income housing.160 This complicated and temporary tax incentive
has not created significant incentives for developers to invest in
low-income housing.16 1
In spite of, and perhaps because of, demand-side federal
assistance programs, the homeless ranks swelled throughout the
1980s.162 Congress reacted to this crisis by enacting the Stewart B.
McKinney Homeless Assistance Act in 1987 (McKinney Act),163
which provides subsidies for emergency and transitional homeless
assistance programs.16 4 In its findings, Congress recognizes its re-
sponsibility to meet the "basic human needs" of the homeless, the
complexity and overwhelming scale of homelessness, and acknowl-
edges that state and local governments lack the resources to meet
even the basic needs of the homeless.1 5 The McKinney Act estab-
160. I.R.C. § 42 (1986). For an overview of the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit
and its amendments under the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1989, see Stearns,
supra note 129; Michael J. Novogradac & Eric Fortenbach, The Low-Income Hous-
ing Tax Credit Impact of the Changes Wrought by the Revenue Reconciliation Act
of 1989, J. Real Estate Tax'n 219 (1989).
161. Revenue Reconciliation Act § 7108(a)(1). The Omnibus Budget Reconcilia-
tion Act of 1990 extended the term of the low-income housing tax credit. Pub. L.
No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388. See Stearns, supra note 129, at 213-23.
162. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
163. Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-77,
101 Stat. 484 (codified in 42 U.S.C. § 11301 (1987 & Supp. 1990)). Other federal ef-
forts to specifically assist the homeless include alcohol, drug abuse, and mental
health programs. Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4213 (codified in 42 U.S.C. §§ 290aa
(1988 & Supp. 1990)); and health services for the homeless, Pub. L. No. 100-177, 101
Stat. 999 (codified in 42 U.S.C. § 256 (1987 & Supp. 1990)).
164. Stewart B. McKinney Homelessness Assistance Act of 1987, 42 U.S.C.
§ 11301(b). The purposes of the Act are to establish an Interagency Council on the
Homeless, coordinate resources and programs, and to fund programs to "assist the
homeless, with special emphasis on elderly persons, handicapped persons, families
with children, Native Americans, and veterans." Id. It would seem that the Act's
purpose is to assist the deserving poor, rather than homeless persons with "per-
sonal pathologies" such as mental illness, alcoholism, or substance abuse.
165. Id. at § 11301(a). Congress found that:
(1) the Nation faces an immediate and unprecedented crisis due to the
lack of shelter for a growing number of individuals and families, in-
cluding elderly persons, handicapped persons, families with children,
Native Americans, and veterans;
(2) the problem of homelessness has become more severe and, in the
absence of more effective efforts, is expected to become dramatically
worse, endangering the lives and safety of the homeless;
(3) the causes of homelessness are many and complex, and homeless
individuals have diverse needs;
(5) due to the record increase in homelessness, states, units of local
government, and private voluntary organizations have been unable to
meet the basic human needs of all the homeless and, in the absence of
greater Federal assistance, will be unable to protect the lives and
safety of all the homeless in need of assistance; and
(6) the Federal Government has a clear responsibility and an existing
capacity to fuUi&ll a more effective and responsible role to meet the ba-
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lishes an emergency food and shelter program, 6 6 an emergency
shelter grants program, 6 7 a supportive housing demonstration
program,168 and supplemental assistance for facilities to assist the
homeless.169 These programs only provide emergency assistance
and do not solve the problems creating homelessness. The McKin-
ney Act creates education and job training programs, which do ad-
dress one of the factors causing homelessness; that is,
unemployment or underemployment. 170 These programs will ex-
pire on October 1, 1992.171
Congress seemingly intended to provide at least some perma-
nent housing for the homeless in the McKinney Act's provisions
for a Section 8 SRO dwellings program,172 and for the use of sur-
plus public buildings and facilities to assist the homeless. 73 The
surplus properties program, however, merely leases facilities to
nonprofit agencies for emergency and transitional assistance for
the homeless. Inadequate funding and administrative delays, how-
ever, circumvent the McKinney Act's potential benefit.174
Two cases brought in the Federal District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia, Lee v. Pierce 175 and National Coalition for the
Homeless v. United States Veterans' Administration [hereinafter
National Coalition for the Homeless], 176 challenged HUD's imple-
mentation of the Act, but failed to expand the types of properties
included in the surplus properties program or to limit HUD's dis-
cretion. In Lee v. Pierce, the plaintiffs tried to enjoin HUD from
selling its single-family housing inventory to anyone but homeless
sic human needs and to engender respect for the human dignity of the
homeless.
Id. (emphasis added).
166. Id. at §§ 11331-11352.
167. Id. at §§ 11371-11377. The Act also requires states to develop comprehensive
homeless assistance plans. Id. at § 11361.
168. Id. at §§ 11381-11388.
169. Id. at §§ 11391-11394.
170. Id. at §§ 11421-11450.
171. Id. at § 11450.
172. Id. at § 11401. Single room occupancy dwellings (SROs) are not an adequate
solution to homelessness even if widely implemented. SROs lack kitchens and
bathrooms and other amenities. In the past, SROs were the last refuge of the poor.
See Ropers, supra note 22, at 187.
173. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11411-11412. The Secretary of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment must collect information about and identify unutilized or underutilized public
buildings that are "suitable for use for facilities to assist the homeless." Id. at
§ 11411(a). The federal government retains title to the property, however, and
merely leases the premises to non-profit agencies that provide food, shelter, or
other services to homeless people. Id. at §§ 11411(d), 11412(b).
174. For example, the SRO program temporarily lost its funding in 1988. Na-
tional Coalition for the Homeless, supra note 18, at 87.
175. 698 F. Supp. 332 (D.D.C. 1988).
176. 695 F. Supp. 1226 (D.D.C. 1989).
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organizations or individuals.177 The court rejected the plaintiffs'
claim that the surplus public buildings program applied to single-
family housing owned by HUD and held that the Act only includes
properties subject to its survey requirement. 78 On the other hand,
the court in National Coalition for the Homeless enjoined HUD
from selling eligible properties until HUD independently deter-
mined whether the properties were suitable for use by nonprofit
agencies assisting the homeless.179 The district court also deter-
mined that the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act
of 1949 (FPASA) does not limit application of the McKinney Act;
therefore, HUD must apply the McKinney Act to properties dis-
posed under FPASA.180 Once HUD decides whether to lease the
property to a nonprofit agency, however, the court will uphold the
agency's action unless it is arbitrary and capricious.'l ' Administra-
tive delays, lack of adequate funding, and the small number of sur-
plus properties involved severely limit whatever help the surplus
properties programs might offer. Ultimately, the McKinney Act's
surplus property program will not expand the nation's stock of af-
fordable housing and it is, at best, a stop-gap measure.
III. Proposals for New Federal Housing Programs
Federal programs must be implemented to solve the low-in-
come housing shortage. State and local governments lack the fi-
nancial resources to construct and maintain low-income public
housing, 8 2 and the private building industry "cannot build unsub-
sidized housing that is affordable to low-income people."'1 3 A
moral obligation to promote citizens' safety and welfare, and to im-
prove society as a whole, justifies federal action.' s 4 Economic con-
177. 698 F. Supp. at 334. In 1988, HUD owned approximately 50,000 vacant sin-
gle-family houses. Id at 335. At the same time, 800,000 households languished on
waiting lists for subsidized housing. Id.
178. IL at 340-41. The "plaintiffs have not shown that the McKinney Act was
intended to apply to HUD's single-family inventory, since that inventory is not
presently subject to a survey requirement." Id Section 11411(a) of the McKinney
Act requires the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development to assess properties
described in surveys submitted by the heads of federal agencies. 42 U.S.C.
§ 11411(a).
179. 695 F. Supp. at 1229-30.
180. Id. at 1231. At the time of trial, only twelve properties were identified by
HUD as suitable for use by nonprofit agencies assisting the homeless. Id Only
four of those suitable properties were offered to assist the homeless. Id at 1233.
181. National Coalition for the Homeless v. United States Veterans' Administra-
tion, 715 F. Supp. 392 (D.D.C. 1989).
182. See supra notes 137-139 and accompanying text.
183. Bratt, supra note 85, at 335-36.
184. Henry Aaron, Rationale for a Housing Policy, in Federal Housing Policy
and Programs: Past & Present, supra note 56, at 34. Although the United States
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siderations lend further support to the case for federal programs.
Some analysts argue that federal programs promote efficient allo-
cation of resources or correct imperfections in the housing
market.I8 5
Perhaps the most compelling argument for federal action is
the consequence of inaction. Without federally sponsored perma-
nent low-income housing, "the homeless population could become
a permanent, large and growing portion of our society and... shel-
ters will become our society's poorhouses." 8 6 Homeless people
need assistance today. The low-income housing shortage deserves
immediate attention from Congress. Solutions to the housing cri-
sis proposed by advocates and scholars range from nationalization
of all rental housing to improved tax incentives for private devel-
opers. As the history of subsidized housing in this country reveals,
a balanced program, which incorporates both demand- and supply-
side measures, stands the best chance of success.
A. Socialized Housing
Socialized housing, which exists in Western European coun-
tries,187 would make housing a right for everyone. 8 8 While all
current federal programs respect private industry's profit expecta-
tions, a socialist approach refuses to define housing as a commodity
and rejects profit-making in the housing market. 89 Socialized
housing would attempt to minimize housing expenses of low- and
middle-income people by reducing reliance on private financing
systems, such as the mortgage industry.19 0 Three basic elements of
Supreme Court refused to recognize housing as an entitlement in Dandridge v. Wil-
liams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), Congress chose to assume responsibility for providing ad-
equate housing to all Americans with the enactment of the National Housing Act,
Pub. L. No. 75-412, 50 Stat. 891 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (1982 &
Supp. III 1985).
185. Aaron, supra note 184.
186. Metropolitan Council, supra note 22, at 22.
187. Emily Achtenberg & Peter Marcuse, Toward the Decommodiication of
Housing, in Critical Perspectives on Housing, supra note 5, at 481.
188. See id. at 476. The goal of socialized housing (housing decommodification) is
"[t]o provide every person with housing that is affordable, adequate in size and of
decent quality, secure in tenure, and located in a supportive neighborhood of choice
.d
189. Chester Hartman & Michael Stone, A Socialist Housing Alternative for the
United States, in Critical Perspectives on Housing, supra note 5, at 485-86.
190. According to socialist theory, affordable housing in the private market is
scarce because the market relies upon credit to finance housing construction and
purchases. Mortgages finance almost all housing, and private mortgages increase
housing costs. Hartman & Stone, supra note 189, at 485; see also Roger Sanjek, Fed-
eral Housing Programs and Their Impact on Homelessness, in Housing the Home-
less 316-17 (1986). The socialist model rejects private credit, such as home
mortgages subsidies, loans to profit-making developers, or § 8 rent subsidies, as a
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a socialized housing program include: direct financing grants for
housing construction and purchases; rent based solely upon ability
to pay; and federal ownership and management of all rental
stock.191
Although socialized housing is appealing in theory, it is im-
practical. Funding to buy and operate the nation's rental stock is
virtually non-existent, especially during an economic recession.
The astronomical debt inflicted upon taxpayers by the thrift indus-
try crisis taints any proposal for major federal housing-related ex-
penditures. Even without financial obstacles, policy-makers would
fiercely resist a program which fixes rental costs upon an ability to
pay. Market-value pricing is deeply ingrained in our society and
income-based pricing would appear to place an unacceptable bur-
den on middle- and upper-income renters. Similarly, without fun-
damental societal change, socialization of the entire rental stock is
inconceivable. Focus on these considerations is not meant to deni-
grate socialized housing, but to acknowledge that ideological biases
in the United States must be overcome before a nationalized hous-
ing program is politically viable.
B Low-Interest; Long-Term Mortgages
Long-term mortgages under the VA and FHA mortgage pro-
grams and suburbanization literally transformed middle-class
American society immediately following World War 11.192 Feder-
ally insured long-term, level-payment, low-interest mortgages
made homeownership possible for a majority of Americans by the
1960s.193 Under favorable market conditions, long-term low-inter-
est mortgage programs work wonderfully for both consumers and
the housing industry. During periods of low inflation, building
construction prospers. This supply-side program indirectly bene-
fits the poor because as high-income consumers buy new homes,
vacated homes become available to low-income consumers.194
Inflation and recession, combined with flaws in the financing
mechanisms of long-term, fixed-rate, low-interest mortgage pro-
means to finance housing because it underwrites the real estate industry's power
and profits. Kathy McAfee, Socialism and the Housing Movement Lessons from
Boston, in Critical Perspectives on Housing, supra note 5, at 420. "[A]nalysis shows
that even with social ownership and production, as long as housing remains depen-
dent on private mortgage credit, it will continue to be expensive to society and in
short supply." Achtenberg & Marcuse, supra note 187, at 478.
191. Hartman & Stone, supra note 189, at 487-88.
192. Sternlieb & LUstokin, supra note 87, at 26-27.
193. Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University, supra note 12, at
Exhibit 9 (in 1974, 64.7% of households owned their home).
194. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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grams, made the thrift industry increasingly economically ineffi-
dent. The thrift industry's collapse, following its deregulation,
severely curtailed an important financing source for low-interest
mortgages; subsequently, homeownership rates fell throughout the
1980s.195 Although a federally insured low-interest mortgage pro-
gram would certainly stimulate the housing industry, it simply will
not work unless the program is drastically modified and strictly
regulated.196
C. Urban Homesteading
Renovation of existing housing stock through urban home-
steading'97 is, in theory, an attractive solution to the housing
shortage because "wasted resources will thus be utilized, decay
will be checked, neighborhoods revitalized and the poor
housed." 98 Urban homesteading has the potential to combat aban-
donment and instability in low-income neighborhoods,199 but stud-
ies indicate that renovation only succeeds some of the time and
under restricted conditions.2 0 0
A study of four rehabilitation programs-neighborhood pres-
ervation partnerships, single family homesteading, multifamily
homesteading, and the rental rehabilitation program-found that
only one multifamily homesteading program improved low-income
housing.2 0 ' This study concluded that:
[L]ow-income cooperatives can serve as a relatively cost effec-
tive means to rehabilitate and stabilize deteriorating buildings
in declining neighborhoods ... [but] considerable technical
assistance is required and ... the risk of failure is fairly
high.202
The study attributed the multifamily homesteading program's suc-
cess to its highly skilled tenant coordinators and to the relatively
195. Ann Meyerson, Housing Abandonment The Role of Institutional Mortgage
Lenders, in Critical Perspectives on Housing, supra note 5, at 194-96; see also Joint
Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University, supra note 12, at App. Tables 9-
10.
196. See supra notes 71-79 and accompanying text.
197. "[U]rban Homesteading addresses the problems of urban decay caused by
residential housing abandonment, and the shortage of housing for low income per-
sons by turning over abandoned properties to low income persons who volunteer to
rehabilitate and inhabit them." Howard E. Mitchell, Jr., Urban Homesteading- The
Philadelphia Experiment 1 (1975).
198. Id.
199. Salins, supra note 132, at 182.
200. Id.; Mitchell, supra note 197, at 82-85.
201. Howard J. Sumka, Creative Reuse of the Existing Stock, in Housing
America's Poor, supra note 87, at 115-34.
202. Id at 133.
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good condition of the buildings.20 3 Even if initially successful, ur-
ban renewal only addresses the supply-side deficiencies of the mar-
ket. Rehabilitation programs do not ensure that low-income
tenants will be able to maintain their renovated homes, that is,
that tenants will be able to afford maintenance and repair costs.
At best, renovation can supplement low-income housing, and
should be used with other federal programs. 0 4
D. Rent Control
Rent control exists whenever the government regulates rent
by intervening in the private, rental housing market.20 5 The pur-
pose of rent control is to protect low- and moderate-income rent-
ing households from rising rental costs.206 Rent control is usually
implemented locally,207 and varies considerably in its provisions.2 "8
Arguably, a restrictive rent control scheme, which requires a
warranty of habitability, eviction restrictions, a moratorium on
condominium conversion, and residential zoning restrictions,20 9
would at least provide short-term relief to low-income tenants.21 0
On the other hand, rent control which "indiscriminately freez[es]
prices" does not necessarily help low-income renters, since anyone
can take advantage of rent control.2 1 The long-term effects of
rent control could be disastrous for low-income renters. "By both
inhibiting the construction of additional rental housing units and
causing owners to reduce the quality and quantity of the existing
[housing] inventory, stringent rent controls worsen whatever hous-
203. Id
204. The Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 101-
645 §§ 251-59, 104 stat. 4734 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 11301 (b) (1990)), cre-
ates a series of pilot programs, including rental housing production, rental rehabili-
tation, sweat equity model programs, home repair services for older and disabled
homeowners, and low-income housing conservation and efficency grant programs.
Presumably, if these pilot programs are successful, Congress will implement large-
scale programs based on these experimental programs.
205. Carty, supra note 24, at 371.
206. Anthony Downs, Residential Rent Controls: An Evaluation 1 (1988).
207. The severity of rent control depends upon a variety of factors. Vacancy de-
control provisions permit landlords of controlled units to raise prices to the market
price when vacated. Rent rollbacks fix the base rent of controlled units while off-
setting rent increases imposed in anticipation of the ordinance's enactment. Other
restrictions include condominium conversion restrictions, eviction controls, and ap-
plication to new construction. Carty, supra note 14, at 373; see also Downs, supra
note 206, at 3.
208. Over 200 communities across the country have adopted some type of rent
control since 1970. Downs, supra note 206, at 1.
209. See Reassessing Rent Control, supra note 153, at 1841.
210. Id
211. Carty, supra note 14, at 376.
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ing shortages existed when they were adopted."212 Rent control,
rather than helping "shelter poor" tenants, would actively inhibit
the construction of low-income housing.
E. Tax Credit to Low-Income Renters
The largest national federal housing program is the federal
income tax code's homeowner deductions for mortgage interest
and property taxes.213 Mortgage and property tax deductions favor
the wealthy.2 14 No comparable tax break exists for the poor be-
cause low-income people tend to be renters rather than
homeowners.215
Existing inequities between homeowners and renters under
the current tax code could be rectified by creating a refundable tax
credit for renters. The tax credit program would give qualified
renters a refundable tax credit, which would be the equivalent of a
direct cash subsidy.21 6 If a renter spends less than the scheduled
credit amount, the difference would be refunded.217 Reductions in
homeowners' subsidies could fund the tax credit.21B
212. Downs, supra note 206, at 40. In a study conducted in eleven cities in 1986,
rent controls were correlated to the annual average number of new multifamily
housing units built. The data indicated that a direct correlation between rent con-
trols and decreased construction existed. Cities suffered, on average, a 48.7% de-
crease in the number of multifamily units built after rent controls were
implemented. Id at 41-42. Restrictive rent controls also adversely affect owners'
maintenance of rental units. Id. at 48-50. The study proved inconclusive on the ef-
fect of moderate rent controls on maintenance levels. Id. at 50.
213. Dolbeare, supra note 55, at 31. I.R.C. § 163(h)(2)(D) (deduction for interest
on mortgages); I.R.C. § 164(a) (deduction for property taxes). These deductions ac-
count for ninety percent of the housing provision costs under the tax code.
Dolbeare, supra, at 31. In 1987, the federal government spent $70 billion on hous-
ing, of which three-quarters was spent to promote homeownership. Simons, supra
note 71, at 284 n.72.
214. Dolbeare, supra note 55, at 36-39 (Tables 10, 11):
In 1981, one quarter of all households had incomes below $10,000, but
they received only one-eighth of all federal housing assistance.... At
the other end of the income distribution, one quarter of all federal
housing assistance went to the seven percent of all households with in-
come above $50,000, and forty-three percent of the assistance went to
the twenty percent of households with incomes between $30,000 and
$50,000.
Id. at 36 (emphasis omitted).
215. "In 1987, 63% of poverty-level households were renters." Simons, supra
note 71, at 269, n.33. See Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University,
supra note 12, at Exhibit 10 and accompanying text. "Rental housing is increas-
ingly the home of the nation's lower-income households, while higher-income
households increasingly choose to own a home." Id. (see accompanying text).
216. Elizabeth A. Roistacher, A Modest ProposaL Housing Vouchers as Refund-
able Tax Credits, in Housing America's Poor, supra note 87, at 166-67.
217. Id. at 166.
218. Id. at 169-70.
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The tax credit program resolves many problems that plague
other demand-side programs, such as the Section 8 Existing Hous-
ing program. The program would not rely upon annual congres-
sional appropriations and would be somewhat immune from
political pressures. Renters would receive the subsidy directly,
eliminating landlord participation and bureaucratic red tape. Fi-
nally, renters could use the tax credit in all rental housing,
whether private or subsidized. The tax credit program would not
increase the amount of low-income housing, but would increase
the economic power of low-income people. It should be used to
supplement supply-side programs, such as publicly subsidized
housing.
F. Public Housing
In 1949, Congress adopted a federal housing policy to provide
"a decent home and a suitable living environment for every Amer-
ican family."21 9 Federal programs inched toward this goal until
the 1980s.220 Today, despite its apparent shortcomings, public
housing "emerges as the only alternative for millions of poor peo-
ple."22 1  The problems undermining previous public housing
projects can be avoided, and Congress should renew its commit-
ment to a public housing program. Such a program would pre-
serve existing public housing,2 provide adequate operating
subsidies and modernization funds, and increase tenant
participation.=
Current federal policy presumes that the public housing ex-
periment failed; however, "many of the problems with the public
housing program are attributable to successful efforts by oppo-
nents of the program to hamstring it through inadequate subsidies
and arbitrary restrictions."22 4 Previous public housing programs'
flaws demonstrate that public housing is not unrealistic but re-
quires adequate funding and design.2 25
219. Housing Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-171 § 2, 63 Stat. 413, 413 (1949).
220. Hartman, supra note 15, at 362.
221. Bratt, supra note 85, at 358.
222. The Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 101-
645, §§ 601-613, 104 Stat. 4734 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 11302(b)) (West Supp. 1990),
will attempt to preserve existing privately-owned affordable rental housing. Con-
gress implemented the Act to protect over 360,000 units of federally assisted hous-
ing that may be withdrawn from the market by their owners through the
prepayment of mortgages insured under the National Housing Act (§ 236 and § 221
(d)(3) programs). - Cong. Rec. H11646 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1990).
223. Bratt, supra note 85, at 356-57.
224. Hartman, supra note 15, at 364.
225. See infra notes 225-226 and accompanying text.
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The financial structure of public housing doomed it to failure
in the 1960s. Federal assistance covered only the construction
costs of public housing through annual payments to bondhold-
ers;226 operating expenses were to be covered by rents. The pro-
gram made no provision for capital expenses necessary for
remodeling and maintenance. 2 7 Tenant rents, based upon income,
fell behind inflation during the 1960s. Physical deterioration of
public housing inevitably followed from lack of capital to make
repairs.=
Low-income people, particularly the homeless, desperately
need housing that only the federal government can provide. Pub-
lic housing, although more expensive than the Section 8 Existing
Housing Program, is no more expensive than programs creating
new housing through the private housing industry.22 9 In order to
avoid the mistakes of the past, a revised public housing program
should provide sufficient subsidies for maintenance and remodel-
ing, as well as subsidies for operational costs.
IV. Conclusion
The chronic affordable housing shortage in the United States,
in conjunction with other factors, precipitated wide-scale home-
lessness in the past decade. Today, women, children and unskilled
workers constitute a significant percentage of the homeless. The
homeless are not victims of their own pathologies but are victims
of a polarized economy and a conservative federal housing policy.
Growing awareness of homelessness is politicizing a previously dis-
parate group.23 o Community support for assistance2 3 ' and home-
less persons' political lobbying232 substantially increase the
pressure to reform federal housing policy. A pragmatic federal
program that combines demand and supply-side approaches must
be implemented. Federal policies should create programs to con-
226. Bratt, supra note 85, at 338, 340-41.
227. Hartman, supra note 15, at 365.
228. Bratt, supra note 85, at 339.
229. Id. at 353.
230. Ropers, supra note 22, at 198-209.
231. See L.A. Times, Dec. 4, 1988, § 1, at 2, col. 1; see also National Coalition for
the Homeless, supra note 18, at 67 (Roper Organization Poll found that sixty-eight
percent of Americans support increased federal aid to the homeless).
232. See generally Piven & Cloward, supra note 27; Ropers, supra note 22, at
212. The solution of the homeless crisis is ultimately political, because the realloca-
tion of resources necessary to provide the homeless with what they need involves
the utilization of economic, social, and political power. Nothing less than a major
shift in priorities at the federal level will do. I&
19911
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serve existing low-income rental stock, create tax credits for rent-
ers, and construct and manage public housing.
